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	FEMKE	KAULINGFREKS		SENSELESS	VIOLENCE	OR	UNRULY	POLITICS?	 	THE	UNCIVIL	REVOLT	OF	YOUNG	RIOTERS			Krisis	2016,	Issue	1	 	www.krisis.eu				Mitch	Hernandez	was	on	holiday,	 visiting	 family	 in	 the	Nether-lands	 in	 late	 June	2015.	On	a	Saturday	evening	 the	42-year-old	man	from	Aruba,	one	of	the	Dutch	Antillean	islands,	attended	the	festival	 “Night	 at	 the	 Park”	 in	 The	Hague	with	 some	 friends.	 A	few	hours	later,	he	was	laying	in	the	back	of	a	police	van,	passed	out	from	lack	of	oxygen,	his	 face	bruised	and	swollen.	A	day	la-ter,	he	was	dead.	Word	spread	quickly	that	Hernandez	had	been	violently	arrested	by	the	police1,	and	that	this	arrest	had	caused	his	death.	Soon	after,	riots	broke	out	in	the	Schilderswijk,	a	wor-king	 class	 and	 multicultural	 neighborhood	 in	 The	 Hague.	 En-raged	crowds	of	young	people	threw	stones	at	the	police,	broke	windows,	plundered	a	supermarket	and	demolished	the	interior	of	a	 local	 theater2.	For	several	days	 the	unrest	 in	 the	neighbor-hood	 continued.	 The	 events	 brought	 into	mind	 the	 similar,	 but	more	 extensive	 riots	 around	 Paris	 and	 other	 French	 cities	 in	2005,	 and	 around	 London	 and	 other	 British	 cities	 in	 20113.	 In	these	 three	 cases	 riots	 broke	 out	 after	 unarmed	 men	 of	 color	died	 following	 a	 confrontation	with	 the	 police.	 The	majority	 of	the	ones	involved	in	the	disruptions	were	young	men	of	migrant	
descent,	 their	 families	 often	 linked	 to	Western	Europe	 through	its	colonial	history,	living	in	neighborhoods	affected	by	poverty.	In	the	media	and	amongst	authorities	an	immediate	moral	con-demnation	 of	 the	 rioters	 prevailed;	 the	 events	 were	 predomi-nantly	 interpreted	as	 senseless,	 criminal	disorder	 instigated	by	deviant	‘outsiders’,	threatening	the	cohesion	of	society4.	Resear-chers,	on	the	other	hand,	often	focused	on	the	sense	of	exclusion	and	 socio-economic	 deprivation	 which	 underlay	 the	 riots	(Lapeyronnie	 2008,	 Kokoreff	 2008,	 Slooter	 2015,	 Lewis	 et	 al.	2011,	 Bertho	 2009,	 Body-Gendrot	 2005,	 Sutterlüty	 2014,	 Klein	2012	 a.o.).	While	 the	motives	 of	 young	 people	 for	 engaging	 in	riots	and	other	public	disturbances	are	often	diverse	and	diffuse,	certain	 shared	 frustrations	 and	grievances	 can	be	noted	 across	contexts.	 A	 pervasive	 sense	 of	 injustice,	 lack	 of	 opportunities,	anger	about	surveillance	and	police	brutality	played	a	role	in	all	three	 cases	 mentioned	 here;	 the	 French	 riots	 in	 2005,	 the	English	riots	in	2011	and	the	Dutch	riots	in	2015.	In	this	article,	I	focus	on	the	political	implications	of	these	shared	grievances	and	the	 disruptive	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 are	 expressed.	 I	 investigate	the	political	significance	of	riots	instigated	by	rebellious	adoles-cents	of	migrant	descent	in	Western	European	cities	such	as	Pa-ris,	London	and	The	Hague.		Can	certain	uncivil5or	unruly	behavior	have	political	significance	outside	of	an	institutionally	endorsed	understanding	of	politics?	It	 is	 this	question	which	 is	often	 left	 insufficiently	addressed	 in	the	 analysis	 of	 unorganized	 civil	 disturbances,	 urban	 violence6	or	riots.	I	use	the	term	“unruly	politics”	to	designate	the	political	agency	of	people	who	are	not	 recognized	as	worthy,	or	 formal,	political	 actors	 within	 the	 domain	 of	 institutional	 politics,	 but	who	nevertheless	interfere	in	the	political	organization	of	socie-ty,	while	they	do	not	abide	by	the	formal,	moral	and	legal	rules	of	accepted	 practices	 of	 civil	 engagement	 and	 political	 participa-tion.	 I	 state	 that	 the	 young	 rioters	 involved	 in	 the	 events	 here	discussed	can	be	 seen	as	unruly	political	 agents	who	express	a	denunciation	of	an	unjust	state	of	affairs	in	institutional	politics.	In	what	 follows	I	 first	 take	the	recent	riots	 in	The	Hague	as	my	
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main	 example	 to	 explicate	how	youth	 from	deprived	neighbor-hoods	 are	 often	 excluded	 from	 the	 accepted	 citizenry	 because	they	are	associated	with	deviant	street	culture.	Their	disruptive	public	 interventions	 are	 easily	 perceived	 as	 senseless	 violence.	The	 ones	 involved	 are	 not	 recognized	 as	 political	 subjects	 but	either	seen	as	threatening	 ‘outsiders’	 to	society,	or	pre-political	victims	of	exclusion.	However,	in	reference	to	Jacques	Rancière’s	notion	of	politics	as	dissensus,	 I	propose	to	consider	disruptive	interventions	 like	 riots	as	events	of	unruly	politics.	Despite	 the	fact	that	unruly	politics	should	not	be	seen	as	a	conscious	politi-cal	 strategy	 to	 establish	 social	 change,	 it	makes	 political	 sense.	Events	 of	 unruly	 politics	 are	 politically	 significant	 not	 because	they	 offer	 clear-cut	 solutions,	 but	 because	 they	 indicate	 a	 pro-blem.	 They	 confront	 us	 with	 existing	 inequalities	 and	 socio-economic	deprivation	and	signal	the	flaws	in	the	existing	formal	structures	of	political	representation.			Rage	about	exclusion	and	desire	for	emancipation	Despite	the	fact	that	Mitch	Hernandez	was	not	a	youth	from	the	neighborhood,	his	death	ignited	a	powder	keg	of	rage	and	frus-tration,	 which	 had	 been	 filling	 up	 for	 quite	 some	 time	 in	 the	Schilderswijk	 in	 The	 Hague.	 Young	 men,	 often	 from	 Dutch-Moroccan	families,	felt	discriminated	and	unjustly	treated	by	the	police	due	 to	 recurrent	 stops,	 identity-checks	and	searches,	 so-metimes	in	front	of	their	own	home	and	often	leading	to	moun-ting	fines7.	Several	violent	arrests	further	increased	the	tensions	between	youth	and	the	police	in	the	neighborhood8.	In	addition	to	the	bad	relationship	with	the	police,	inhabitants	felt	stigmati-zed	by	the	media.	In	2013	the	national	newspaper	Trouw	publi-shed	 an	 article	 based	 on	 investigative	 journalism	 in	 the	 Schil-derswijk,	 announcing	 that	 a	 part	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 was	informally	ruled	by	the	Sharia9.	This	news	caused	quite	a	politi-cal	 stir.	 Right-wing	 politician	 Geert	 Wilders	 visited	 the	 neigh-
borhood,	where	he	commented	that	he	felt	like	he	was	no	longer	in	 the	 Netherlands10.	 Questions	 were	 asked	 in	 Parliament	 and	Minister	 of	 Social	 Affairs	 Lodewijk	 Asscher	 promised	 that	 the	government	would	 protect	 the	 ‘central	 values	 of	 the	Dutch	 de-mocratic	and	constitutional	state’	and	prevent	the	emergence	of	‘parallel	societies’	where	inhabitants	take	the	law	into	their	own	hands11.	Despite	 complaints	 of	 several	 inhabitants	who	did	not	recognize	 their	neighborhood	 in	 the	media	 coverage,	 the	 Schil-derswijk	became	easily	associated	with	the	territory	of	deviant,	non-integrated	 and	 radicalized	 foreign	 elements,	 perceived	 as	causing	a	 threat	 to	Dutch	 society12.	This	 image	was	 further	 en-forced	when	a	small	group	of	radicalized	young	Muslims	demon-strated	with	an	ISIS-banner	in	the	neighborhood	in	the	summer	of	201413.	The	newspaper	Trouw	eventually	withdrew	the	arti-cle	about	the	so-called	‘Sharia-triangle’	in	the	Schilderswijk,	after	having	 discovered	 that	 the	 journalist	 responsible	 had	 invented	sources.	However,	the	negative	image	of	the	neighborhood	per-sisted14.	Several	researchers	and	community	organizers	warned	that	 riots	 could	break	out	 if	 authorities	would	not	make	public	efforts	 to	 recognize	 the	 sense	 of	 exclusion	 of	 the,	 especially,	young	inhabitants	of	the	Schilderswijk15.	When	Mitch	Hernandez	died	at	the	hands	of	police	officers	from	The	Hague,	this	seemed	to	be	the	last	straw.	Violent	clashes	with	the	police	followed	and	the	division	in	the	area	between	young	people	and	the	authori-ties	was	once	again	enforced.	 Ironically,	 the	 same	 image	which	led	to	mounted	frustration	was	enforced	by	the	riots:	that	of	the	Schilderswijk	as	an	area	where	 ‘outsiders’	undermine	 the	well-being	of	Dutch	civilized	society.	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	riots	were	not	readily	recognizable	as	a	political	event,	since	there	were	no	signs	of	a	deliberate	politi-cal,	 militant	 strategy16.	 The	 disturbances	 emerged	 randomly,	with	 social	media	bringing	 together	young	people	who	had	ne-ver	met	before	and	who	did	not	express	clearly	 formulated	de-mands	or	a	clearly	formulated	political	ideology.	The	rioters	did	not	make	 public	 statements	 about	 their	motives	 and	were	 not	
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represented	by	spokespeople	who	addressed	the	press.	Without	intentionally	communicated	vision	or	goals	the	riots	were	easily	perceived	as	a	haphazard,	mindless	provocation.	Some,	including	the	 Mayor	 of	 The	 Hague,	 indicated	 the	 Ramadan	 and	 the	 out-doors	heat	as	causes	of	the	disruptive	events17.	Due	to	these	fac-tors	young	Muslim	people	in	the	neighborhood	seemed	to	be	on	edge,	 looking	 for	 excitement	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 sun	 set.	 However,	others	who	themselves	had	participated	strongly	linked	the	riots	to	 unequal	 opportunities	 and	 other	 experiences	 of	 unequal	treatment	by	the	authorities.	On	radio	channel	FunX,	Yusuf	said	that	after	 the	riots	he	 felt	relief	 from	his	stress	about	the	many	times	he	was	stopped	and	rudely	 treated	by	the	police	 for	only	being	 a	 young	 brown	man	 driving	 a	 nice	 car.	 Sky	 said	 that	 he	wanted	 to	 target	 the	 government	 and	 that	 the	 death	 of	 Mitch	Henriquez	 was	 not	 even	 on	 his	 mind	 when	 he	 joined	 the	 rio-ters18.	These	statements	indicate	that	the	initial	tragic	event	be-came	 a	 pretext	 for	 expressing	 a	 variety	 of	 latent	 frustrations.	Large	 numbers	 of	 young	 people	 from	 outside	 of	 the	 neighbor-hood	became	involved	in	the	disturbances.	The	violence	seemed	to	 be	 motivated	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 incentives,	 ranging	 from	 rage	about	regular	confrontations	with	racism	and	discrimination,	to	the	pleasure	of	breaking	the	power	monopoly	of	the	police	in	the	public	domain,	or	 the	personal	opportunism	of	obtaining	mate-rial	goods	which	are	completely	out	of	reach	under	normal	cir-cumstances.	A	journalist	who	observed	the	scene	stated	that	the	Schilderswijk	 became	 a	 ‘collection	 site	 of	 anger’19.	 He	 quoted	another	rioter	saying:	 “Everything	 that	belongs	 to	 the	state	can	be	destroyed.	(…)	Talking	does	not	solve	anything.	They	are	not	listening.	 Once	 a	 white	 man,	 always	 a	 white	 man.	We	 have	 to	fight	 for	 our	 rights.”20	 French	 anthropologist	 Michel	 Kokoreff	also	 concludes	 that	 the	 structural	 ingredients	 in	 the	 pressure-cooker	that	lead	to	the	emergence	of	riots	are	feelings	of	injusti-ce	and	humiliation,	most	often	inflicted	by	the	police	(2008,	19).	According	to	Kokoreff,	the	violence	of	riots	has	two	dimensions:	an	 expressive	 dimension	 and	 an	 instrumental	 dimension.	 The	expressive	dimension	reflects	the	feeling	that	the	use	of	violence	
is	the	only	way	to	convey	discontent	and	to	be	heard	by	those	in	power,	 while	 the	 instrumental	 dimension	 reflects	 the	 wish	 to	make	 the	state	and	other	public	services	aware	of	 the	basic	re-sources	 that	 the	adolescents	 involved	 lack	 in	 their	 lives	 (Koko-reff	2008,	18).	It	is	both	the	rage	about	exclusion	and	the	desire	for	emancipation	that	inspire	riots.	Even	the	looting	which	takes	place	 during	 riots	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 attempt	 of	 disqualified,	poor	young	people	to	finally	gain	the	tokens	of	success	belonging	to	 a	 dominant	 culture	 of	 consumption	 in	 neoliberal,	 capitalist	societies	(Bauman	2012,	Winlow	&	Hall	2012).	In	this	sense,	the	riots	can	be	seen	as	a	desperate	act	to	make	the	state	and	the	ge-neral	public	aware	of	the	grievances	of	young	people	in	margina-lized	 positions.	 This	 brings	 the	 famous	 Martin	 Luther	 King	 Jr.	quote	into	mind:	A	riot	is	the	language	of	the	unheard.	However,	the	state	is	not	inclined	to	listen.		Street	culture	versus	civil	culture	The	fact	that	riots	are	not	readily	recognized	as	political	events	is	emphasized	by	the	reaction	of	state	representatives,	who	are	primarily	focused	on	the	maintenance	of	public	order	and	deny	responsibility	 for	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 the	 disturbances	 (Lamble	2013).	Authorities	offer	a	representation	of	the	events	as	a	cer-tain	state	of	exception	that	can	only	be	rightly	dealt	with	by	ef-fective	risk-management	and	a	repressive	practice	of	policing.	As	a	consequence,	the	events	tend	to	be	understood	not	in	relation	to,	but	in	opposition	to	society	as	lawless	deeds,	inspired	by	per-sonal	 frustrations	or	desires	of	abnormal	young	people	who	do	not	know	how	to	behave	like	good	citizens.	This	attitude	of	state	officials	enforces	the	perceived	lack	of	representation	in	mecha-nisms	of	institutional	politics	of	the	young	people	involved.		In	the	case	of	the	riots	in	The	Hague	a	pattern	can	be	distinguis-hed	which	was	also	visible	at	the	onset	of	the	earlier	riots	in	Pa-
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ris	 and	 London	 (Sutterlüty	 2014,	 41-43).	 In	 all	 cases	 violence	erupted	after	a	confrontation	with	fatal	consequences	took	place	between	the	police	and	a	man	of	color21.	The	police	 initially	re-fused	to	take	responsibility	for	the	events.	In	The	Hague,	the	po-lice	announced	that	Mitch	Hernandez	had	been	fine	before	ente-ring	 the	 police	 van,	 and	 had	 become	 unwell	 during	transportation.	However,	video	footage	emerged	showing	that	a	group	 of	 officers	 held	 Hernandez	 in	 a	 choke-hold	 before	 drag-ging	 him	 into	 the	 van	 while	 he	 was	 already	 unconscious.	 Re-search	later	proved	that	police	violence	was	indeed	the	cause	of	Hernandez’	 death22.	 Secondly,	 when	 peaceful	 protests	 started,	representatives	 from	 the	 institutional	domain	showed	a	 lack	of	recognition	 for	 the	grief	of	 those	surrounding	 the	victim,	and	a	lack	of	respect	for	those	expressing	their	frustration	and	discon-tent	 regarding	 the	events23.	 In	The	Hague	 the	 first	violent	 skir-mishes	took	place	in	front	of	the	police	station	Heemstraat	in	de	Schilderswijk,	 when	 demonstrators	 felt	 they	 were	 not	 suffi-ciently	 and	 seriously	 addressed	 by	 the	 police24.	 Other	 state	 re-presentatives	 added	 fuel	 to	 the	 fire	 by	 failing	 to	 recognize	 the	frustrations	leading	up	to	the	riots,	and	primarily	focusing	on	the	rioters	 as	 criminals.	 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 Prime	 Minister	 Mark	Rutte	 called	 the	 rioters	achterlijke	 gladiolen	 (retarded	knuckle-heads)	and	seemed	to	be	more	upset	by	the	destruction	of	pro-perty	 in	 the	 neighborhood	 than	 by	 the	 death	 of	 Mitch	 Henri-quez25.	Mayor	of	The	Hague	Jozias	van	Aertsen	spoke	about	the	brute	violence	of	‘vandals’	and	denied	the	existence	of	police	vio-lence	 or	 discrimination	 in	 his	 city26.	 The	 reaction	 of	 Nicolas	Sarkozy,	then	French	Minister	of	Internal	Affairs,	to	the	Parisian	riots	and	the	reaction	of	David	Cameron,	British	Prime	Minister,	to	the	London	riots	were	even	stronger.27	Sarkozy	described	the	youth	 involved	 in	 the	 French	 riots	 as	 criminal	 gang	 members	and	 scum	 from	whom	 the	 country	 should	 be	 liberated.	 British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	analyzed	the	London	2011	riots	as	a	sign	of	the	“moral	collapse”	of	a	“broken	society.”	By	stating	that	this	moral	collapse	is	manifested	by	a	lack	of	parenting	skills	in	“troubled”	families,	and	that	an	“all-out	war	against	gangs	and	
gang	culture”	is	needed,	Cameron	sought	the	origin	of	the	riots	in	deviant	 socio-psychological	 behavior,	 youth	 culture	 and	 youth	delinquency.	He	explicitly	stressed	 that	 the	riots	were	a	matter	of	gang	culture	and	not	of	poverty,	discrimination	or	unequal	so-cial	opportunities.		These	statements	indicate	that	the	riots	are	not	seen	as	an	aspect	of	the	social	dynamics	within	society,	but	as	a	threatening	desta-bilization	of	society	by	those	who	do	not	merit	to	be	seen	as	fel-low	citizens.	The	riots	are	framed	as	originating	from	a	deviant	street	 culture	 which	 generally	 threatens	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	Western	European	cities28	 (Decker	and	Weerman,	2005),	while	possible	political	motives	are	not	acknowledged.	Frustrations	in	relation	to	discrimination,	ethnic	profiling,	poverty	and	isolation	are	not	recognized	as	valid	incentives	underlying	the	disruptive	events	 and	 are	 consequentially	 not	 seen	 as	 issues	 of	 injustice	and	inequality	which	could	be	tackled	in	the	political	arena.	Hen-ce,	the	rioters	seem	to	be	alien	aggressors,	affecting	society	from	the	 outside.	 Politicians	 deny	 having	 a	 relation	with	 these	 trou-blemakers,	 let	 alone	 take	 responsibility	 for	 addressing	 their	grievances.	 Prime	Minister	Mark	 Rutte	 said	 he	 did	 not	 see	 the	need	to	visit	the	Schilderswijk	to	engage	in	a	conversation	with	the	rioters	because	he	considered	them	fools	causing	a	scene29.	A	continuous	emphasis	on	the	‘pointless	violence’	in	the	actions	of	 young	 ‘troublemakers’	 places	 them	 outside	 of	 the	 body	 of	‘normal’	 citizens,	 and	 inside	 a	 frame	 of	 deviant	 exponents	 of	 a	dangerous	street	culture.	Their	abnormality	is	seen	as	being	cau-sed	by	social	and	educational	deficiencies,	alcohol	and	drug	abu-se,	 criminal	 tendencies	 and/or	 an	 aggressive,	 antisocial	 youth	culture30.	This	street	culture	seems	to	collide	with	the	dominant,	civil	 culture	 in	 society	 (Van	Strijen,	 2009)	 and	 seems	 to	be	de-void	 of	 any	 socio-political	 awareness.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this	dichotomy	young	 rioters	are	easily	placed	outside	of	 the	moral	structure	and	political	rules	of	society.	They	are	not	recognized	as	political	agents	because	their	actions	seem	to	lack	a	clear	poli-
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tical	 goal	 and	a	 strategy	aimed	at	 constructive	and	effective	al-ternatives.	 This	 depoliticization	 of	 the	 riots	 becomes	 possible	when	 political	 participation	 is	 defined	 within	 an	 institutional	context.	One	acts	politically	if	one	either	remains	within	the	fra-mework	 of	 political	 institutions	 by	 the	 practice	 of	 voting	 or	membership	 of	 a	 political	 party,	 or	 if	 one	 aims	 to	 deliberately	reform	this	framework	of	political	institutions,	by	adopting	soci-al	movement	strategies	such	as	demonstrations	and	strikes.	The	actions	of	young	rioters	do	not	fit	in	with	this	representation	of	politics.		I	wish	 to	 contest	 this	 exclusion	 from	 the	domain	 of	 citizenship	and	politics	of	young	urban	troublemakers,	by	stating	that	their	disruptive	interventions	in	urban	space	can	be	seen	as	a	form	of	unruly	political	agency	(Kaulingfreks	2015).	In	the	act	of	rioting,	marginalized	young	people	can	make	themselves	visible	as	citi-zens	who	are	not	sufficiently	represented	in	the	formal	practice	of	 politics.	 Their	 disruptive	 actions	 therefore	 have	 a	 political	sense,	even	 if	 they	express	 themselves	 in	unconventional	ways,	even	if	they	operate	outside	of	the	domain	of	the	law	and	even	if	they	do	not	share	a	dominant	culture,	which	 is	 imagined	as	the	foundation	of	good	citizenship.			The	apparent	senselessness	of	riots		Before	I	take	a	closer	look	at	rioting	as	a	form	of	unruly	political	agency,	it	is	important	to	indicate	that	the	events	are	often	inter-preted	as	non-political	or	pre-political	because	the	people	invol-ved	 are	 not	 recognized	 or	 represented	within	 the	 political	 do-main.	Various	analyses	of	the	French	riots	of	2005	can	serve	as	an	 example	 here,	 in	which	 the	 lack	 of	 political	 agency	 of	 those	involved	 is	 emphasized,	 exactly	 because	 they	 are	 positioned	 at	such	 a	 distance	 from	 institutional	 politics.	According	 to	 French	anthropologist	Alain	Bertho,	 riots	 in	 general	 can	be	 seen	 as	 an	
enraged	and	frustrated	reaction	to	the	painful	distance	between	an	 officially	 recognized	 political	 discourse	 and	 the	 complicated	social	reality	in	which	people	living	in	precarious	circumstances	find	 themselves	 (2009).	Riots	 thus	 indicate	a	profound	rupture	between	the	political	domain	of	the	state	and	the	desire	for	poli-tical	recognition	of	the	people.	Robert	Castel	equally	states	that	riots	in	which	youth	from	the	French	banlieues	are	involved	can	be	seen	as	a	desperate	call	for	attention	of	those	who	are	not	re-cognized	as	full	citizens	in	possession	of	political	agency	(Castel	2006).	 The	 rioters	 cannot	 be	 political	 agents,	 because	 of	 their	exclusion.	Peter	Sloterdijk	explicitly	looks	at	the	Parisian	riots	in	2005	and	states	that	a	lack	in	the	political	system	was	painfully	presented,	 but	 no	political	 agenda	was	 established.	 The	 rioters	rage	 and	 “hatred	 against	 the	 status	 quo”	 were	 not	 effectively	channeled	by	existing	political	movements	and	could	not	there-fore	be	translated	into	one	overarching	project	of	transformati-on.	 No	 political	 parties	 took	 up	 the	 task	 to	 convert	 the	 violent	and	destructive	 energy	of	 the	 riots	 into	 a	 constructive	political	strategy	 (Sloterdijk	2010,	206).	The	 rioters	 therefore	 remained	stuck	in	a	senseless	destruction	of	territory,	infected	by	an	“epi-demic	 of	 negativity”	 (Sloterdijk	 2010,	 211).	 For	 Sloterdijk,	 the	demonstration	of	a	lack	in	the	existing	political	order	has	no	po-litical	meaning	in	itself.	It	is	only	in	a	profitable	operationalizati-on	for	actual	and	effective	change	that	the	violent	expression	of	anger	and	frustration	can	make	sense.	He	therefore	makes	a	dis-tinction	 between	 useless,	 and	 thus	 senseless,	 violence	 and	 the	profitable	operationalization	of	violence	for	a	higher	goal.		Michel	Wieviorka	and	Étienne	Balibar	also	emphasize	 the	 inca-pacity	of	young	rioters	to	convert	their	violent	disruptions	into	a	constructive	 and	 effective	 political	 agency.	 Michel	 Wieviorka	characterizes	those	who	are	involved	in	urban	violence	as	“floa-ting	subjects”	(2005,	292-293).	The	floating	subject	is	not	capa-ble	of	 translating	his	or	her	social	demands	 into	actions,	which	make	 sense	 within	 a	 socio-political	 frame	 of	 reference.	 Hence,	the	 violent	 behavior	 of	 such	 a	 “floating	 subject”	 seems	 to	 be	
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adrift,	devoid	of	any	connection	 to	 the	rest	of	society.	The	 floa-ting	subject	seems	to	signal	a	“lack	of	sense,”	and	 is	characteri-zed	as	non-social	and	non-political	by	Wieviorka.	Étienne	Balibar	makes	a	similar	analysis	of	the	subjectivity	of	young	rioters,	with	a	slightly	different	conclusion.	According	to	him,	involvement	in	riots	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 “antipolitics”	(Balibar	 2007,	 62).	When	 citizenship	 is	 emptied	 of	 its	 content,	because	a	group	is	not	seen	as	a	full	part	of	the	nation	and	there-fore	 denied	 representation	within	 the	 political	 system,	 we	 can	speak	of	 “antipolitics.”	The	revolt	of	 rioters	 is	 in	 the	process	of	becoming	political	(2007,	65).	What	makes	it	not	yet	political	is	its	singularity,	the	lack	of	connections	with	other	groups	in	soci-ety	which	 suffer	 from	similar	 injustices	 and	mechanisms	of	 ex-clusion.	Alain	Badiou	analyzes	the	London	riots	of	2011	in	a	si-milar	 vein.	 Badiou	 describes	 these	 riots	 as	 an	 example	 of	‘immediate	 riots’.	 Such	 riots	 emerge	 as	 an	 immediate	 reaction	“in	 the	wake	of	 a	violent	episode	of	 state	 coercion”	 (2012,	22).	Immediate	 riots	 are	 too	 premature	 to	 hold	 a	 political	 signifi-cance,	 because	 of	 their	 lack	 of	 organization	 and	 focus.	 Badiou	reserves	political	meaning	for	events	which	lead	to	intentionally	organized,	 militant	 uprisings.	 Such	 uprisings	 require	 a	 strong	ideological	proposition,	around	which	the	masses	can	be	mobili-zed,	and	a	strong	political	organization,	which	follows	the	initial	events.	 Central	 to	 such	 events	 is	 the	 political	 organization	 of	 a	universal	emancipatory	subject	which	could	do	away	with	“iden-titary	fictions,”	as	they	are	applied	by	the	state.	The	aim	of	such	fictions	is	to	separate	groups	of	people	with	differently	ascribed	identities	from	the	generic	collective	of	the	people,	who	could	act	affirmatively	together	(ibid.,	92-93).	In	contrast,	immediate	riots	have	an	“impure	subject”	(ibid.,	26)	because	the	intentions	of	the	involved	actors	cannot	be	ascribed	to	the	same	universal	revolu-tionary	 aspirations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 locality	 of	 the	 riots	 cannot	transcend	 into	 a	 larger	 movement	 of	 uprising,	 which	 also	 ap-peals	 to	 people	who	 are	 of	 a	 completely	 different	 identity	 and	social	status	to	that	of	the	instigators.	
Within	these	reflections	on	the	riots	 it	 is	assumed	that	 in	order	to	act	politically,	a	certain	political	subject	 intentionally	applies	violent	 measures	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 a	 predetermined	 goal.	 The	distinction	between	senseless	violence,	which	stands	alone,	and	purposive	 violence	 as	 a	means	 to	 an	 end	 can	 be	 inscribed	 in	 a	more	general	analysis	of	the	political	meaning	of	public,	violent	agency.	Discussions	of	the	political	meaning	of	violence	are	often	understood	in	a	relational	setting	between	means	and	ends,	re-volving	around	the	question	of	the	legitimacy	of	an	instrumental	use	 of	 violence	 in	 light	 of	 a	 higher	 political	 goal31.	 The	 central	question	here	is	whether	violence	can	be	legitimized	as	a	tempo-rary	tool	to	be	used	in	the	project	of	the	creation	of	a	better,	mo-re	 equal	 and	more	 just	world,	 in	which	 the	 very	 violence	 itself	can	 later	 be	 completely	 abolished	 (Welten	 2006).	 Violence	 ap-pears	to	be	senseless	if	it	has	no	clear	instrumental	value	in	rela-tion	 to	 an	 external,	 recognizable	 goal.	 The	more	 riots	 seem	 to	emerge	as	singular	events,	which	“just”	seem	to	happen	because	it	was	hot,	and/or	the	opportunity	was	there	and	the	adrenaline	took	 over,	 the	 easier	 they	 are	 discredited	 as	 acts	 of	 senseless	vandalism.	It	is	this	“autotelic”	aspect	of	senseless	violence	that	is	the	most	frightening	and	the	least	understandable	(Schinkel	2010).	Auto-telic	 violence	 is	 pure	 and	 immediate	 since	 it	 is	 not	 focused	 on	anything	other	 than	 its	own	performance	(Schinkel	2010,	100).	While	a	form	of	violence	which	is	purely	autotelic	is	hard	to	ima-gine,	every	kind	of	violence	is	at	least	partially	inspired	by	a	cer-tain	attraction	to	violence	itself	and	is	therefore	partly	autotelic.	Cases	of	urban	violence	can	easily	be	seen	as	examples	of	autote-lic	–	and	therefore	senseless	–	violence	because	of	their	sudden,	unpredictable	 appearance,	 irrational	 development	 and	 lack	 of	clear	focus.	It	is	the	random	element	of	destruction	and	also	the	apparent	enjoyment	of	the	violence	by	its	instigators	which	ma-kes	them	an	ideal	cause	for	moral	panic	amongst	the	general	pu-blic	(Schinkel	2008,	Cohen	1972).	The	fact	that	urban	riots	seem	to	defy	all	laws	imaginable,	even	those	of	militant	strategies,	ma-
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kes	 them	 intensely	 threatening.	 The	 general	 public	 cannot	 un-derstand	the	motivation	underlying	the	riots	and	is	shaken	by	its	effects.	The	 riots’	 autotelic	 element	 clarifies	 comments	 that	de-scribe	 them	 as	 a	 danger	 to	 national	 security,	 civil	 peace	 and	shared	solidarity,	and	makes	measures	 like	a	declaration	of	na-tional	emergency	understandable	(Goodwin	et	al.	2012,	Ossman	and	Terrio	2006,	6).		Riots	to	indicate	a	lack	in	the	political	system	The	shock	effect	and	singularity	of	riots	could	also	be	 interpre-ted	differently,	if	we	perceive	them	not	as	expressions	of	a	tradi-tional	 political	 conscience	 (Belhaj	 Kacem	 2006).	 However,	 the	fact	that	they	cannot	be	inscribed	in	a	political	strategy	which	is	generally	 understood	 to	 be	 rational	 and	 constructive,	 does	 not	make	them	politically	insignificant.	Belhaj	Kacem	speaks	of	a	po-litical	 “inoperativeness”	 that	 is	 expressed	 by	 the	 young	 people	involved	 in	 French	 riots	 (2006,	 10)	 –	 a	 certain	 “unworking”	 of	political	 structures.	 Their	 actions	 are	 testimonies	 of	 precisely	those	 aspects	 of	 the	 political	 system	 that	 do	 not	work,	 at	 least	not	for	them.	As	far	as	explicit	claims	can	be	read	in	acts	of	rio-ting,	 such	 events	 allude	 to	 something	 that	 is	 radically	missing.	This	is	a	fundamentally	different	mode	of	expression	than	that	of	an	organized	political	insurrection.	Slavoj	Zizek	emphasizes	that	this	 inoperativeness	 of	 riots	 is	 not	 devoid	 of	 political	 signifi-cance,	even	though	we	cannot	inscribe	this	significance	in	a	tra-ditional	framework	of	emancipatory	political	agency.	In	his	book	“On	Violence,”	 Zizek	describes	 the	 riots	 that	 took	place	 around	Paris	 in	 2005	 as	 a	 wild	 and	 uncontrolled	 outburst	 of	 violence	without	 a	 future	 perspective	 of	 transformation	 (2008).	 This	“outburst	with	no	pretence	to	vision”	seems	to	be	an	illustration	of	the	“post-ideological”	times	in	which	we	live	(Zizek	2008,	63).	No	realistic	alternatives	were	proposed	for	experienced	 injusti-ces;	 only	 an	 uneasy	 feeling	 of	 resentment	 without	 explanation	
was	transmitted.	However,	Zizek	sees	the	riots	as	a	“direct	effort	to	gain	visibility”	(2008,	65)	of	those	who	are	excluded	from	the	domain	of	social	and	political	organization.	“[T]hey	found	them-selves	on	 the	other	side	of	 the	wall	which	separates	 the	visible	from	 the	 invisible	 part	 of	 the	 republican	 social	 space”	 (Zizek	2008,	66).	Here,	the	riots	become	significant	not	in	order	to	offer	a	 solution,	 but	 in	 order	 to	 indicate	 a	 problem:	 the	 problem	 of	those	banned	from	society	and	confined	to	a	status	of	 the	“out-law.”	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	 the	 riots’	 apparent	 senseless-ness	 where	 their	 political	 sense	 can	 be	 found.	 The	 disorder	which	riots	imply	seem	senseless	from	an	organized	perspective	on	politics,	but	make	political	sense	if	we	look	at	them	as	a	vio-lent	condemnation	of	an	order	which	has	become	unacceptable	because	 of	 the	 injustices	 it	 produces.	 The	 perceived	 senseless-ness	of	riots	 is	caused	here	by	a	 lack	of	recognition	for	the	 less	visible	systemic	violence	against	which	it	is	opposed.	These	qualifications	of	 the	riots	bring	Rancière’s	notion	of	poli-tics	as	dissensus	into	mind.	As	Jacques	Rancière	mentions,	a	dis-ruption	of	the	status	quo	in	politics	can	have	a	political	meaning	even	without	a	deliberately	developed	political	strategy,	precise-ly	because	it	calls	attention	to	a	lack	of	representation	within	in-stitutional	politics.	Not	surprisingly,	Mustafa	Dikeç	identifies	the	2005	riots	around	Paris	as	“unarticulated	justice	movements”,	in	reference	to	Rancière	(2007,	3900	kindle	edition).	For	Rancière,	politics	 does	 not	 imply	 a	 negotiation	 of	 interests	 of	 identity-based	groups	within	a	neutral	sphere	of	parliamentary	debates,	nor	does	it	imply	the	exercise	of	power	(2010,	27).	Instead,	poli-tics	begins	where	 the	exercise	of	power	 is	 interrupted,	and	 the	orderly	organization	of	society	is	disturbed,	in	the	name	of	those	who	 are	 excluded	 from	 that	 organization.	 As	 Douzinas	 states,	Ranciere	 places	 the	 excluded	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 politics	 (Douzinas	2013,	 113).	 Politics	 should	 therefore	 not	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 do-main	of	ruling	 institutions,	but	rather	on	the	 level	of	disruptive	interactions	between	people	without	any	status	and	those	ruling	institutions.	 Rancière	 takes	 the	 expression	 of	 dissensus	 as	 a	
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point	of	departure	for	considering	his	notion	of	politics,	even	if	it	carries	us	across	the	boundaries	of	lawful	political	participation.	He	explicitly	focuses	on	the	role	that	marginalized	groups,	which	are	 not	 recognized	 as	 taking	 part	 in	 any	 existing	 political	 pro-cess,	 can	play	 in	 the	emergence	of	a	new,	political	 evocation	of	equality.	 Politics,	 in	 his	 opinion,	 emerges	 in	 the	 moment	 that	people	express	their	disagreement	with	an	order	of	governance	which	falsely	pretends	to	reflect	the	equal	distribution	of	“social	parts	 and	 shares”	 (Rancière	2010,	35,37).	Rancière	 speaks	of	 a	disagreement	 which	 is	 fundamental	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 it	cannot	 be	 solved	 by	 aiming	 at	 a	 consensus	 under	 the	 same	shared	 terms,	 because	 the	 one	 party	 does	 not	 even	 recognize	that	 the	 other	 party	 is	 communicating	 something.	 Both	 parties	disagree	 because	 they	 not	 only	 speak	 a	 different	 language,	 but	also	because	at	least	one	party	is	not	recognized	as	an	equal	ad-dressee	or	an	equal	adversary	in	the	same	discussion	(Rancière	1999,	xii).	This	kind	of	radical	disagreement	involves	not	only	situations	in	which	 the	 language	 used	 by	 a	 party	 is	 not	 recognized	 as	mea-ningful	language,	but	also	–	and	even	more	often	–	situations	in	which	the	very	existence	of	a	group	of	people	is	not	recognized	as	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 meaningful	 part	 of	 society.	 According	 to	Rancière,	those	who	are	marginalized	because	they	are	poor,	or	because	they	deviate	in	other	ways	from	the	accepted	norm,	are	structurally	 kept	 in	 their	 subordinate	 place.	 This	 happens	 not	only	because	they	are	not	taken	seriously	as	actors	in	the	public	domain,	but	because	their	utterances,	whether	linguistic	or	not,	are	not	recognized	as	having	any	meaning	at	all	(Hewlett	2007,	97).	A	failure	to	recognize	someone	as	a	“political	being”	begins	by	 “not	understanding	what	he	 says”	 (Rancière	2010,	38).	This	happens,	 for	 example,	 when	 expressions	 of	 certain	 people	 are	not	recognized	as	meaningful	in	the	public	domain,	because	they	are	confined	to	another	domain.	An	example	would	be	the	situa-tion	 in	 which	 rebellious	 young	 people	 are	 confined	 to	 the	 do-main	 of	 street	 culture,	which	 is	 seen	 as	 detached	 from	 the	 do-
main	 of	 civic	 culture.	 In	 that	 situation,	 these	 young	 people	 are	not	recognized	as	“political	beings,”	since	 their	public	 interven-tions	are	 seen	as	 senseless	vandalism,	which	does	not	 conform	to	 the	political	rationality	of	 “normal”	citizens.	Yet,	 if	we	 follow	Rancière’s	 understanding	 of	 politics,	 it	 is	 precisely	 those	 who	disturb	the	existing	socio-political	order	who	are	acting-out	poli-tically.	The	act	of	disruption	in	itself	gains	political	significance.	Young	rioters	can	reveal	who	is	not	 included	within	the	system	of	governance,	and	hence	confront	us	with	the	very	limits	of	the	majority’s	dominant	understanding	of	politics.			Riots	as	events	of	unruly	politics	Ranciere’s	 analysis	 clarifies	 how	 those	who	 disrupt	 an	 exclusi-onary	political	order	can	be	seen	as	political	agents.	When	peop-le	 stand	 up	 to	 declare	 their	 own	 equality	 to	 others,	 and	 also	 if	they	do	not	conform	to	dominant	norms	of	good	citizenship,	this	is	 an	 act	 of	 political	 subjectification,	 according	 to	 Ranciere.	 In	such	 a	 case,	 the	division	 is	 denied	between	 those	 categories	 of	people	who	can	share	in	the	construction	of	a	political	order,	and	those	who	cannot,	and	 it	 is	recognized	that	 “equality	cannot	be	received,	 because	 to	 receive	 equality	 is	 already	 to	 be	 less	 than	equal	to	the	one	who	bestows	it”	(May	2008,	71).		Because	politics	as	disagreement	causes	a	sudden	awareness	of	the	equal	presence	of	certain	excluded	groups,	 its	emergence	is	always	 simultaneously	 embedded	within	 a	 particular	 situation,	and	 causes	 a	 deregulatory	 effect	 within	 that	 situation.	 Riots	emerge	in	a	direct	reaction	to	a	specific	practice	of	political	go-vernance,	 which	 does	 not	 guarantee	 civic	 equality	 (Sutterlüty	2014,	 49).	 Rancière	 offers	 a	 general,	 structural	 analysis	 of	 dis-agreement	and	disruption	as	politically	meaningful.	I	propose	to	understand	the	riots	here	discussed	as	events	of	unruly	politics,	because	in	these	cases	the	disruption	of	the	political	order	is	ex-plicitly	subversive,	violent,	and	 law	transgressing32.	The	percei-ved	 senselessly	 violent	 nature	 of	 the	 events	 and	 the	 perceived	
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incivility	of	those	involved	indicate	how	much	unruly	politics	can	differ	 from	 accepted	 forms	 of	 political	 agency.	 It	 defies	 the	boundaries	 of	 dominant	 rules.	 Rioters	 take	 the	 law	 into	 their	own	 hands,	when	 the	 existing	 laws	 no	 longer	 correspond	with	the	principle	of	justice	as	they	perceive	it.	However,	even	though	riots	and	other	cases	of	urban	violence	manifest	themselves	out-side	of	 the	ruling	 legal	order,	 they	do	not	 lack	every	relation	to	the	 law.	 Such	 violent	 events	 emerge	 out	 of	 a	 discontentment	with	–	and	therefore	a	direct	engagement	with	–	that	legal	order,	rather	than	a	complete	detachment	from	that	legal	order.	Unruly	politics	does	not	spring	out	of	nowhere.	It	might	be	the	only	op-tion	 left,	 if	 disadvantaged	 groups	 feel	 that	 their	moral	 outrage	about	 their	 situation	 is	not	 shared	by	 the	general	public,	 and	 if	laws	 and	 institutions	 represent	 only	 a	 narrow	 sense	 of	 justice,	serving	 the	 interests	 of	 certain	 privileged	 groups	 in	 society	(Shelby	2007,	157-158).	In	the	uncomfortable	and	disruptive	act	of	 street	 disturbances	 and	 rioting,	 it	 becomes	 apparent	who	 is	excluded	from	the	political	game,	as	it	is	played	in	the	conventi-onal	way.	Young	rioters	often	do	not	feel	that	they	are	part	of	the	system	of	political	representation	at	all.	This	feeling	of	exclusion	can	become	a	legitimation	for	rebellious	young	people	to	design	their	own	rules	of	the	game.	In	this	sense,	unruly	politics	 is	not	about	creating	a	state	of	total	anarchy,	but	rather	about	creating	“subversive	ruliness.”	The	translation	of	justice	into	a	system	of	laws	is	not	dismissed	as	useless	or	unnecessary	altogether;	it	 is	the	functioning	of	existing	laws	which	is	questioned.		To	sum	it	up:	Unruly	politics	is	a	name	for	describing	the	inter-ventions	 of	 those	 who	 disrupt	 the	 framework	 of	 institutional	power	 relations,	 because	 they	 are	 in	 a	 position	 which	 leaves	them	no	other	option	for	influencing	the	organization	of	society	other	 than	 to	disrupt	 the	 status	quo,	which	does	not	 represent	their	needs.	 It	 is	a	practice	of	politics	 that	would	not	make	any	political	sense	if	we	were	to	define	politics	only	within	the	limits	of	the	institutional	political	game.		
Unruly	politics,	as	we	define	it,	is	political	action	by	people	who	have	been	denied	voice	by	the	rules	of	the	political	game,	and	by	the	social	rules	that	underpin	this	game.	It	draws	its	power	from	transgressing	 these	 rules	 –	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 upholding	others,	which	may	not	be	legally	sanctioned	but	which	have	legi-timacy,	deeply	rooted	in	people’s	own	understandings	of	what	is	right	and	just.	This	preoccupation	with	social	 justice	distinguis-hes	these	forms	of	political	action	from	the	banditry	or	gang	vio-lence	with	which	 threatened	 autocrats	wilfully	 try	 to	 associate	them.	(Khanna	et	al.	2013,	14)	Unruly	politics	demands	“a	new	mode	of	political	enquiry	which	spills	outside	of	traditional	notions	of	politics,	and	in	which	the	relevance	of	acts	and	events	is	not	reduced	to	the	effect	they	ha-ve	on	 formal	structures	of	 the	political	establishment”	 (Khanna	et	 al.	 2013,	 11).	 Expressions	 of	 unruly	 politics	 do	 not	 allow	themselves	 be	 translated	 into	 the	 language	 of	 negotiated	 de-mands	 and	 interests,	within	 a	 setting	 of	 parliamentary	mecha-nisms	(Khanna	et	al.	2013,	10).	They	do	not	abide	by	the	logics	of	representative	politics,	but	rather	enunciate	a	political	meaning	which	is	unmediated,	which	does	not	let	itself	be	represented	or	translated	in	another	context,	 in	another	moment	or	for	the	be-nefit	of	other	people.	Unruly	politics	is	always	situated	in	a	speci-fic	time	and	place,	engaging	specific	people.	It	cannot	be	reduced	to	 fit	 into	 general	 procedures,	 designed	 to	 bring	 a	 plurality	 of	people	together	in	one	body	of	manageable	citizens.	At	the	same	time,	expressions	of	unruly	politics	evoke	a	deep	wish	 to	 live	a	dignified	 life	 and	be	 treated	 justly	 by	 state	 representatives,	 re-gardless	 of	 the	 particular	 envisioning	 of	 what	 a	 dignified	 life	might	 entail	 in	 each	different	 situation,	 for	 every	different	per-son.	It	is	not	carefully	designed	as	a	party-political	campaign,	nor	is	it	driven	by	great	revolutionary	aspirations	or	clearly	defined	ideologies,	but	rather	emerges	in	unexpected	events.	It	does	not	only	 take	place	at	 sites	 that	are	 specifically	designed	 for	public	and	political	debate;	it	also	politicizes	spaces	which	are	meant	to	be	neutral	or	private,	such	as	the	streets.	
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Unruly	 political	 agency	 is	 necessarily	 critical	 towards	 the	 legi-timacy	of	the	state,	as	long	as	the	state	does	not	safeguard	justice	and	 equality	 for	 all,	 regardless	 of	 people’s	 social	 and	 economic	privileges,	 or	 their	 citizenship	 status.	 Those	who	 lack	 a	 formal	citizenship	 status,	 or	who	 feel	 impaired	 in	making	 use	 of	 their	formal	citizenship	status,	literally	gain	space	for	their	lives	in	in-formal	or	extra-legal	ways.	Through	 these	same	 informal	 chan-nels	 they	 sometimes	 have	 considerable	 impact	 on	 the	 formal	domain	of	politics.	The	more	the	range	of	unruly	political	events	expand	and	become	publicly	known,	 the	more	chance	 they	will	gradually	 transform	 into	a	more	conventional	mode	of	political	agency	 and	be	 incorporated	 into	 the	domain	of	 formal	 politics.	After	 the	 flames	 are	 extinguished	 and	 the	 smoke	 clears,	 politi-cians	can	feel	the	pressure	to	recognize	the	grievances	of	rioters,	and	new	social	movements	 can	emerge	 from	 the	 initial,	 violent	and	 disruptive	 events.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 English	 riots	 of	 2011,	Nunes	states	that	the	events	were	politically	significant	as	a	star-ting	point	for	further	politicization,	even	though	a	variety	of	mo-tives	and	incentives	was	apparent	and	not	all	participants	were	consciously	‘doing	politics’.	The	events	showed	tensions,	but	also	possibilities	 for	 solidarity	 between	 a	 young	 gentrifying	 lower-middle	 class	 and	 a	 young	 underclass	 in	 the	 neighborhoods	where	the	riots	took	place,	for	example	(Nunes	2013,	572-573).	In	this	sense,	the	notion	of	unruly	politics	is	similarly	related	to	the	 domain	 of	 institutional	 politics	 as	 the	 “informal	 politics”	which	Asef	Bayat	describes	 in	his	book	“Street	Politics”	(1997).	Bayat	explores	 the	political	agency	of	 the	urban	poor	and	mar-ginalized	in	the	Middle	East,	who	have	no	‘institutional	power	of	disruption’	(1997,	p.	xii),	but	rather	disrupt	 institutional	power	constellations	with	their	day	to	day	struggles	to	gain,	sometimes	literally,	a	place	 in	society.	What	Bayat	names	street	politics,	 is	first	and	foremost	a	movement	of	ordinary	people	who	wish	to	secure	the	necessary	means	to	make	a	living	for	themselves	and	their	close	ones,	while	suffering	 from	a	 “lack	of	an	 institutional	mechanism	 through	 which	 they	 can	 collectively	 express	 their	
grievances	 and	 resolve	 their	 problems”	 (Bayat	 1997,	 9).	At	 the	same	time,	the	fact	that	many	people	struggle	simultaneously	for	their	 personal	 survival	makes	 it	 possible	 for	 a	 shared	 political	sense	 in	these	singular	struggles	to	emerge.	The	streets	are	the	domain	where	 they	meet	 and	 form	 occasional	 alliances	 (Bayat	1997,	17).		These	people	 live	perforce	without	 the	 support	 of	 official	 state	institutions,	yet,	at	the	same	time,	they	often	deeply	distrust	any	state	 interference	 in	 their	 lives.	 Out	 of	 fear	 of	 being	 regulated,	controlled	or	disciplined	by	formal	state	procedures,	they	search	for	autonomous	and	alternative	ways	to	sustain	themselves	and	gather	 in	 informal	 communities	 in	which	 they	are	 free	 to	mind	their	own	business.	They	do	not	feel	the	urge	to	make	publicity	for	any	claims	of	general	 interest	or	 to	recruit	allies	 in	the	per-spective	of	a	general	 transformation	of	 society.	These	struggles	are	related	to	what	James	Scott	named	‘everyday	forms	of	resis-tance’,	 which	 are	 less	 concentrated	 in	 singular,	 public,	 violent	and	explosive	events	such	as	urban	riots.	Informal	street	politics	therefore	differs	from	unruly	politics.	However,	it	can	be	similar-ly	differentiated	from	both	institutional	politics	and	the	‘conten-tious	politics’	of	new	social	movements	(Lettinga	&	Kaulingfreks	2015).	 In	 contrast	 to	 social	 movements,	 both	 the	 urban	 poor	who	 engage	 in	 street	 politics,	 and	 young	 rioters	 who	 instigate	events	 of	 unruly	 politics,	 do	 not	 form	 a	 coherently	 structured	collective	around	clearly	formulated,	shared	political	claims	or	a	collective	 ideology.	Bayat	 prefers	 to	 speak	of	 “nonmovements”,	in	 reference	 to	 “the	 collective	 actions	 of	 noncollective	 actors;	they	 embody	 shared	 practices	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 ordinary	people	whose	fragmented	but	similar	activities	trigger	much	so-cial	change,	even	though	these	practices	are	rarely	guided	by	an	ideology	or	 recognizable	 leaderships	 and	organizations”	 (Bayat	2010,	14).	Other	than	in	social	movements	the	emphasis	 is	pla-ced	 on	 the	 undertaking	 of	 collective	 ‘action’	 (sometimes	 out	 of	self-interest)	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 articulation	 of	 collectively-shared	 ‘meaning’	 (Bayat	1997,	7).	Conflicting	motives,	 convicti-
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ons	and	agendas	are	common	in	the	domain	of	street	politics	as	well	as	in	events	of	unruly	politics,	and	strong	leadership	is	ab-sent.	Bayat’s	analysis	further	clarifies	how	the	agency	of	people	with	 similar	 experiences,	who	do	not	 organize	 themselves	 into	political	pressure	groups	or	social	movements,	can	nevertheless	make	political	sense	in	an	unruly	way.			Recognizing	the	rioters	The	analysis	of	unruly	politics	is	aimed	at	finding	political	mea-ning	beyond	the	borders	of	formal	governance.	These	considera-tions	should	not	be	understood	as	a	simple	celebration	of	violen-ce,	 illegality	 and	 incivility.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 celebrating	unruliness	as	 the	only	 true	political	option	here.	As	 I	have	em-phasized	 before,	 unruly	 politics	 takes	 place	 in	 an	 inextricable	relationship	with	formal	political	institutions	and	cannot	be	seen	as	an	alternative	replacement	for	these	institutions.	However,	a	critical	examination	of	our	imagined	political	community	cannot	take	place	without	 listening	 to	 the	voices	of	 those	who	express	themselves	in	unconventional	or	undesirable	ways,	but	who	ne-vertheless	share	the	social	world	with	us.	Whether	we	condemn	or	support	their	actions,	young	rioters	co-exist	in	the	same	socie-ty	with	“familiar”,	law-abiding	citizens,	and	we	therefore	have	to	consider	 the	 possible	 political	 meaning	 of	 their	 actions	 before	we	make	further	judgments.		If	 we	 a	 priori	 dismiss	 the	 involved	 actors	 of	 riots	 and	 other	unorganized	civil	disturbances	as	not	having	any	relation	to	the	practice	of	active	citizenship	and	politics,	the	lack	of	recognition	and	representation	which	they	experience	is	enforced.	An	analy-sis	 of	 said	 disruptive	 events	 in	 the	 light	 of	 unruly	 politics	 pre-vents	 such	 immediate	 exclusion.	We	 should	merit	 the	 political	sense	of	unruly	political	actions,	such	as	riots	and	public	distur-bances,	 as	 acts	 in	 themselves,	without	 immediately	 demanding	
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	http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/wat-zijn-de-oorzaken-van-de-rellen-warmte-ramadan-of-racisme~a4093838/	
18	See:	“Waar	komt	de	woede	in	de	Schilderswijk	vandaan?”,	FunX	Radio,	June	30th,	 2015.	 http://www.funx.nl/news/den-haag/24589-waar-komt-de-woede-in-de-schilderswijk-vandaan	
19	See:	‘’Morgen	weer?’	Klinkt	het	in	de	Schilderswijk’.	Volkskrant.	July2,	2015.	http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/-morgen-weer-klinkt-het-in-de-schilderswijk~a4093303/	
20	 My	 translation,	 source:	 ‘’Morgen	 weer?’	 Klinkt	 het	 in	 de	 Schilderswijk’.	
Volkskrant.	July2,	2015.	 	http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/-morgen-weer-klinkt-het-in-de-schilderswijk~a4093303/	
21	 In	 Paris,	 in	 the	 northern	 banlieue	 of	 Clichy-sous-Bois,	 two	 boys	 were	electrocuted	when	they	were	hiding	in	a	power	substation	after	fleeing	a	poli-ce	check.	The	police	initially	denied	that	the	boys	were	fleeing	the	police	and	insinuated	 that	 they	were	 involved	 in	 criminal	activities.	However,	 the	boys	did	not	have	a	criminal	record.	In	London,	a	young	man	from	the	impoveris-hed	Broadwater	Farm	estate	in	Tottenham,	was	shot	dead	by	the	police	in	an	attempt	to	arrest	him.	The	police	initially	insinuated	that	the	victim	had	fired	a	 gun	 first,	 which	was	 not	 the	 case.	 (See,	 Kokoreff	 2008	 and	 Lammy	 2011,	amongst	others).	
22	 See:	 ‘Rapport	Rijksrecherche:	Geweld	agenten	oorzaak	dood	Mitch	Henri-quez.	 RTL	 Nieuws.	 November	 6,	 2015.	http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/rapport-rijksrecherche-geweld-agenten-oorzaak-dood-mitch-henriquez	
23	In	France	major	riots	broke	out	after	the	police	threw	a	tear-gas	canister	at	the	entrance	of	a	mosque	where	a	commemoration	ceremony	was	held	for	the	electrocuted	victims.	In	London	riots	started	when	a	peaceful	demonstration		
	including	 family	members	of	 the	 shot	victim	was	not	 addressed	by	a	 senior	police	officer.	
24	 See:	 ‘’Vriend,	 het	 was	 de	 Ramadan’:	 De	 Schilderswijk	 is	 nog	 steeds	 licht	ontvlambaar.’,	De	Groene	Amsterdammer.	November	4,	2015.	
25	See:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdxztyfJGc0&feature=youtu.be	
26	See:	http://www.funx.nl/news/den-haag/24602-van-aartsen-quote-2	
27	See:	“Inflammatory	Language,”	Guardian,	November	8,	2005.	 		http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2005/nov/08/inflammatoryla;	“Eng-land	riots:	Broken	society	is	top	priority	-	Cameron,”	BBC,	August	15,	2011.	 	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14524834.	
28	 See:	 http://efus.eu/en/topics/risks-forms-of-crime/collective-violence/efus/2567/,	Consulted	November	1st,	2012	
29	See:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdxztyfJGc0&feature=youtu.be	
30	See:	“Rioting	in	France:	What’s	wrong	with	Europe?,”	November	7,	2005,	 	http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/rioting-in-france-what-s-wrong-with-europe-a-383623.html;	 	“David	Starkey	on	UK	riots:	 ‘The	whites	have	become	black,’”	Guardian,	August	13,	2011.	 	http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2011/aug/13/david-starkey-whites-black-video;	“How	gangs	have	taken	the	place	of	parents	 in	urban	ghettoes,”	
Independent,	 August	 10,	 2011.	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/how-gangs-have-taken-the-place-of-parents-in-urban-ghettoes-2335074.html.	
31	The	reflections	of	Hannah	Arendt,	Jean-Paul	Sartre	and	Franz	Fanon	on	the	use	of	violence	in	a	political	context	show	how	this	means-end	logic	can	offer		
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20	
	different	reasons	for	either	accepting	or	rejecting	violence	as	a	political	stra-tegy	(Arendt	1970,	Fanon	2004).	The	distinction	between	the	legitimate	and	illegitimate	use	of	violence	as	a	means	is	first	made	in	relation	to	the	state	and	its	role	as	the	protector	of	law	and	order,	and	the	revolutionary	power	of	the	people,	who	in	certain	cases	feel	the	moral	duty	to	replace	the	existing	state	with	a	better	one.	The	question	then	becomes	whether	a	political	transforma-tion	of	society	can	be	brought	about	by	violent	means	 in	contestation	of	 the	law,	or	whether	 the	 law	should	be	respected	as	 the	 final	resource	of	 justice,	and	politics	as	a	practice,	which	can	only	be	performed	through	deliberative	means.	 However	 divergent	 the	 conclusions	 of	 Arendt	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	Sartre	and	Fanon	on	the	other,	their	positions	demonstrate	the	dominance	of	an	instrumental	approach	to	violence,	for	the	sake	of	conceptualizing	its	poli-tical	significance.		
32	Because	of	this	explicit	violent	and	subversive	nature	I	do	not	describe	the	riots	 as	 a	 form	of	 civil	 disobedience.	 Like	 unruly	 politics,	 civil	 disobedience	can	be	expressed	when	citizens	doubt	the	constitutionality	of	the	measures	of	government,	or	if	they	can	no	longer	sufficiently	influence	the	government	by	standard	means	of	participation.	However,	when	understood	in	the	Arendtian	tradition,	 civil	 disobedience	 should	 always	 be	 non-violent,	 directed	 at	 the	laws	 and	 policies	 of	 the	 government,	 and	 openly	 expressed	 in	 public.	 Civil	disobedience	becomes	permissible	when	it	is	expressed	by	“organized	minor-ities	that	are	too	important,	not	merely	in	number,	but	in	quality	of	opinion,	to	be	safely	disregarded.”	(Arendt	1972,	76).	Here	Arendt	emphasizes	that	acts	of	civil	disobedience	should	be	well	organized,	rooted	in	a	rationally	defenda-ble	position	and	related	to	clearly	formulated	demands.	This	is	not	the	case	in	relation	 to	 the	 riots	here	described.	 Jacqueline	Rothfusz	proposes	 to	 stretch	the	criteria	that	Arendt	defined	for	civil	disobedience,	in	order	to	include	ex-pressions	of	discontent	which	are	violent	and	not	directly	addressed	at	gov-erning	authorities	(2012,	24).	She	proposes	to	identify	a	broader	borderland	between	 criminality	 and	 civil	 disobedience.	 The	 expressions	 of	 dissent	 of	young	rioters	could	thus	be	labeled	as	civil	disobedience.	I	do	not	adopt	this	interpretation	of	the	term	civil	disobedience,	since	the	young	rioters	here	dis-	
	cussed	do	not	represent	an	accepted	minority	voice	within	the	public	debate,	but	rather	have	the	position	of	outsiders	to	the	very	domain	of	civil	participa-tion.	Given	the	characteristics	of	their	expressions,	and	the	fact	that	they	are	not	accepted	as	a	valuable	part	of	civil	society,	it	is	not	civil	disobedience	but	rather	 “uncivil”	 disobedience,	 which	 is	 expressed	 by	 young	 urban	 trouble-makers.	Costas	Douzinas	discusses	the	term	‘democratic	disobedience’	as	an	alternative	 in	cases	where	 the	defense	of	 fundamental	rights	or	 their	 imple-mentation	in	specific	policies	is	not	prioritized,	but	the	entire	operation	of	the	political	 system	 and	 social	 hierarchies	 are	 at	 stake.	 He	 also	 states	 that	 it	 is	doubtful	whether	this	term	extends	to	contemporary	cases	of	resistance	and	revolt,	in	which	the	democratic	deficit	is	enormous	(Douzinas	2013,	95).	Last-ly,	the	disruptive	interventions	of	young	rioters	are	very	distinct	from	other,	more	activist-oriented	examples,	which	are	understood	as	civil	disobedience	–	such	as	the	Occupy	movement	and	feminist	movement	FEMEN	–	because	of	their	spontaneous	and	chaotic	character,	as	well	as	their	lack	of	a	clearly	for-mulated	organization	and	political	agenda.	 Instead	of	using	the	same	term	–	civil	 disobedience	 or	 democratic	 disobedience-	 to	 describe	 all	 these	 disrup-tive	 actions,	 the	 additional	 term	 ‘unruly	 politics’	 can	 help	 to	 clarify	 certain	important	distinctions.									
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